The Problem with Escalation

So I've been doing a little thinking about Obama's proposed troop escalation in Afghanistan.

I'm sure that this hasn' t been lost on anyone, as you don't have to be a scholar of history to recognize the parallels between Afghanistan and US involvement in Vietnam. The bottom-line here is that there is no way that there can be decisive victory in the Afghan theatre through military might - just ask the Soviets. In order to truly secure victory in the region, the real solution will come through negotiation and multi-lateral politicking.

The theory behind the escalation, I'm sure, will be an attempt to replicate the American success of the 'surge' manoeuver in Baghdad earlier this year. The redeployment of troops focussed on quelling insurgency through overwhelming strength and presence. But, if we examine the British example in the case of Northern Ireland, the picture of absolute victory becomes one more filled with diplomatic success than with military power. The fact remains that the British were in Northern Ireland for better than 30 years fighting an enemy that was neither traditional, nor easily identifiable. The occupation, or 'The Troubles', resulted in more than 3,500 casualties on all sides and as many as 47,000 wouded - not to mention the terror campaign against the British mainland that included the now infamous bombings at Birmingham, Guildford, and London; as well as the ambushing of British subjects on the European continent. In the end, the Troubles were ended after a series of negotiated ceasefires broke down, and all-party talks were conducted leading to the Belfast Agreement in 1998 - the agreement restored self-government to Northern Ireland using a power-sharing model that included Sinn Fein, the political arm of the IRA.

The other two conflicts that are relevant here are, of course, Vietnam, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The first of these is probably the most questionable manoeuver in the history of the American military. The deployment of 'advisors' in Vietnam began in early 1950 and steadily increased with the first combat units arriving in 1965 - by 1975, over 8 million Americans had seen action in Vietnam. Further to that, by the time the US left Southeast Asia, the conflict had claimed close to 60,000 American servicemen, and sent more than 150,000 home wounded. On the Viet side, according to the Vietnamese government in 1998, the military casualties on the North Vietnamese side alone are estimated at 1.1 million servicemen, as well as a civilian death toll that ranges anywhere from 50,000 to 'several million'. When the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan in 1979 behind a force of 100,000 troops in the initial invasion, and a further 100,000 in reserve, the numbers are similarly alarming - estimates put the Afghan civilian death toll anywhere between 600,000 and 2 million, and Soviet casualties hovering around 15,000. The USSR pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989. In both cases, in spite of staggering human cost, no major policy objectives were achieved; ie: Vietnam was reunified in 1976, and the Parchams were ousted from power following the Soviet withdrawal and ensuing Civil War.

Apparently, history has taught us nothing.

Escalation will only serve to swell the ranks of the insurgency, and further aggravate an already explosive situation. The time has come to sit down and hammer out a deal that will see the Afghan people install a functional government and begin rebuilding their shattered country. This end cannot be accomplished through the use of military force, and it should be the focus of the new Administration to ensure that this end is met as quickly as possible.